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ABSTRACT
In countries where wages are primarily set by collective bargaining, the effects on unemployment
of changes in the economic environment depend crucially on the speed of learning of unions. This
speed of learning is likely to depend in turn on the quality of the dialogue that unions have with
firms, on what can more generally be called the quality of labor relations. In this paper, we examine
the role this quality of labor relations has played in the evolution of unemployment across European
countries over the last 30 years. We conclude that it has played an important role: Countries with
worse labor relations have experienced higher unemployment. This conclusion remains even after
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In countries where wages are primarily set by collective bargaining, the
e®ects on unemployment of changes in the economic environment are likely
to depend crucially on the speed of learning of unions.
This speed of learning is likely to depend in turn on the quality of the
dialogue that unions have with ¯rms, on what can more generally be called
the quality of labor relations.
In this paper, we examine the role this quality of labor relations has played
in the evolution of unemployment across European countries over the last
30 years. We conclude that it has played an important role.
We start, in Section 1, with a \case study", that of the Netherlands. After
increasing to 11% in the early 1980s, Dutch unemployment turned around,
reaching a low of 2% in the early 2000s. This turnaround is directly trace-
able to wage moderation. This wage moderation appears directly traceable
in turn to the dialogue between unions and ¯rms, and to the unions' com-
mitment to reestablish su±cient pro¯t margins so as to increase capital
accumulation and employment.
We then present, in Section 2, a simple model of wage determination and
unemployment. We show how the e®ects on unemployment of di®erent
changes in the economic environment depend crucially on the perceptions
of unions and their speed of learning.
We then turn, in Section 3, to the cross country evidence. We construct
two measures of the quality of labor relations, the ¯rst based on strike
intensity in the 1960s, the other based on surveys of managers in the 1990s.
We show that countries with worse labor relations have experienced higher
and longer-lasting unemployment. We show that the e®ect remains even
after controlling for labor market institutions.
22 The Netherlands
The evolution of unemployment in the Netherlands since the early 1980s is
often called the \Dutch unemployment miracle".1 After increasing from 2%
in 1970 to 11% in 1983, the unemployment rate turned around, decreasing
steadily to reach a low of 2% in 2001. Today, it has increased back to 6%,
but most of the increase since 2001 appears to be cyclical.
The focus on the unemployment rate is not misleading. It is sometimes
argued that the increase in employment has come from job sharing, from
an increase in part-time employment. This is not correct: The increase in
part-time employment, which has indeed been substantial, has been more
than matched by an increase in the participation rate, in particular by
an increase in the participation rate of women. It is also argued that the
decrease in unemployment hides a high number of workers on disability.
While it is true that disability rolls are still very high, they have decreased
with unemployment, and thus cannot account for the decrease in unem-
ployment.
There is general agreement that the proximate source of the turnaround
in unemployment is wage moderation. This can be seen in Figure 1, which
plots the unemployment rate and the (log) wage in e±ciency units. The
wage (or more precisely the labor cost, as the measure includes both the
wage and non-wage bene¯ts) in e±ciency units is constructed under the
assumption of Harrod neutral technological progress, following Blanchard
[1997]; it is normalized to equal zero in 1970-71. On a balanced growth
path with constant unemployment, the wage in e±ciency units should be
constant. Thus, one can think of decreases in this wage measure as re°ecting
wage moderation. As Figure 1 indicates, the wage in e±ciency units has
indeed decreased steadily since the early 1980s, standing in 2001 at 83% of
its 1970 value; this decrease is substantially larger than the decrease of the
1. Two useful references are Visser and Hemerijck [1997], and Nickell and Van Ours
[2000].
3same variable for the European Union as a whole. This wage moderation
has led to an increase in pro¯t, which has led to an increase in capital
accumulation, and an increase in employment over time.
Figure 1. Unemployment and wage in e±ciency units, in the
Netherlands, 1970-2002.
There is also general agreement that the start of this wage moderation can
be traced to a particular event, the \Wassenaar Accord," signed at the
end of 1982 between unions, business organizations and the government.
At that time, unemployment had increased very quickly, and pro¯t and
investment rates had collapsed. Unions, explicitly recognizing the need to
reestablish pro¯t margins, agreed to wage moderation. Despite tensions
along the way, this commitment to wage moderation has remained to this
day.
This short description may give the impression of a process smoother than
it actually was. The Wassenaar Accord was preceded by nine attempts and
nine failures in the previous nine years. The Accord itself was a complex
agreement, with much give and take, including a commitment by ¯rms to
consider decreasing working time (at the same wage per hour). Yet, it re-
mains the case that the turnaround in wage setting happened earlier in
the Netherlands than in other European countries, and observers credit it
and its subsequent follow-through to a long-standing tradition of dialogue
between unions and ¯rms. Katzenstein [1985] for example attributes it to
\corporatism," which he de¯nes as \an ideology of partnership, expressed
at the national level ( ); and voluntary and informal coordination of con-
°icting objectives through continuing bargaining between interest groups,
state bureaucracy, and political parties."
An important question, in light of the research on the causes of unem-
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Wage normalized to zero in 1970-71. Wassenaar Accord signed at the end of 1982
Fig. 1: The Netherlands, 1970-2002attributed directly to this change in union attitudes given labor market
institutions, and how much can be attributed to reforms of these labor
market institutions. The question goes beyond the scope of this paper (see
Nickell and Van Ours [2000] for an exploration, Schettkat [2003] for a care-
ful characterization of institutions and institutional change), but one can
make the following remarks:
The period since 1982 has seen a number of reforms of the Dutch labor
market. These reforms have however taken place in the late 1980s and the
1990s, thus some time after the start of wage moderation and the start of
the decline in unemployment. The reforms have typically not been radical;
rather, they have reduced some of the distortions associated with a given
level of social insurance, rather than decreased that level. A decrease in
replacement rates, and the conditioning of bene¯ts on the acceptance of
\suitable jobs" have decreased the incentives to remain unemployed. Expe-
rience rating of ¯rms according to their history of worker disabilities have
decreased the incentives for ¯rms and workers to use disability programs
as alternatives to unemployment. In general, however, the Dutch system
of social insurance remains more generous than the EU average, indeed
more generous than the average of the four largest EU countries|France,
Germany, Spain, and Italy|that today have much higher unemployment
than the Netherlands.
3 Shocks, learning, and unemployment
The purpose of this section is to show that the e®ects of shocks on unem-
ployment depend very much on whether and how fast they are perceived
by unions. The model we present makes no claim to generality; its goal
is to introduce some of the major shocks which are typically thought to
have been behind movements in unemployment in Europe over the last 30
5years, and show how, in each case, the response of unemployment depends
crucially on union's perceptions.
² Assume an aggregate production function of the form:
y = min(k;an)
where y;k;n are output, capital, and employment respectively, and a








² Assume that the supply of capital is given by:
k = a(1 + µ(¼ ¡ r))
where r is the user cost faced by ¯rms, and the parameter µ measures
the response of the supply of capital to net pro¯t|the pro¯t rate net
of the user cost. The presence of a on the right hand side is to insure
the existence of a balanced growth path, where capital and output
increase at the same rate.









² Assume an economy wide union, acting as a monopoly union, and
maximizing the wage bill, wn, subject to the perceived labor demand
schedule:







6Note that we allow union perceptions of µ, a, and r, all denoted by
hats, to di®er from the actual values of these three parameters.
The assumption that the union chooses the wage unilaterally, subject
to the perceived labor demand, is not particularly realistic. It is how-
ever convenient, and allows us to avoid an interesting but di±cult
issue, the nature of bargaining when the two sides (the ¯rms and the
union) di®er in their perceptions. Here, only the union's perceptions
matter for the choice of the wage.










and employment is given by equation (1) (¯rms are assumed to know
the true parameters).
If perceptions are correct, employment is given by:
n =
1 + µ(1 ¡ r)
2
(3)
Keeping µ and r constant, the economy follows a balanced growth
path, where capital, output, and real wages grow with a, and where
employment remains constant.
Now consider three types of shocks.
² Suppose there is a slowdown in productivity growth, a decrease in
the rate of growth of a, as was indeed the case in Europe starting in
the mid-1970s.
If perceptions are correct, so ^ a remains equal to a, wages adjust in line
with a, and, as equation (3) indicates, employment remains constant.
If however perceptions do not fully adjust, so ^ a exceeds a for some
time, employment will be lower until ^ a converges back to a.
7² Suppose there is a sharp increase in the real interest rate, as was
indeed the case in the 1980s and early 1990s in most European coun-
tries. Even if perceptions are correct, so ^ r remains equal to r, em-
ployment will decrease as unions prefer to cut both the wage and
employment. If perceptions do not adjust however, the wage does
not change, and the decrease in employment will be larger.
² Suppose, last, that there is an increase in capital mobility, an increase
in µ. This evolution has been less studied than the previous two, but
has clearly taken place in Europe over the last 30 years, and may be
quite relevant: The elimination of capital controls and the reduction
of other barriers to capital movements have surely increased the elas-
ticity of capital to its rate of return. So has the widespread process
of privatization: Private owners are typically much more sensitive to
the rate of return than the state.
Under the assumption that perceptions are correct, such an increase
in µ leads to an increase in employment: The higher elasticity of cap-
ital to the pro¯t rate, and by implication the higher elasticity of em-
ployment to the wage, lead the union to moderate its wage demands,
and thus lead to an increase in employment. If perceptions do not
change however, wages do not adjust, and employment may actually
decrease. This depends on whether, initially, ¯rms were making pos-
itive or negative net pro¯ts. If net pro¯ts, 1 ¡ w=a ¡ r were initially
negative, employment will initially decrease, as capital moves out.
Only over time, as perceptions and wages adjust, will employment
recover and end up ultimately higher.
In all these cases, the speci¯c dynamics of adjustment will depend on the
speed at which unions learn and adjust wages. The speed of learning is likely
to depend in turn on how easy these changes in the economic environment
are to identify. Productivity growth, measured, say, by TFP growth, has
a large transitory component from year to year. It clearly took a while for
8the slowdown of the mid 1970s to be fully perceived (not only by unions,
but by economists and policy makers as well); for some time, the slowdown
was largely hidden from view by the e®ects of the two oil price increases.
Changes in interest rates should be easier to observe, although unions may
not fully perceive the implications for investment and ultimately for em-
ployment. Increases in capital mobility may also be hard to assess. Indeed,
some unions in Europe still speak as if pro¯ts were largely rents to be ap-
propriated by workers, without implications for employment. While such
rhetoric may have been appropriate in some parts of the economy in the
past, it is surely not a good assumption about capital mobility today.
Formally introducing uncertainty and learning raises a number of concep-
tual issues. First, ¯rms, under the maintained assumption that they per-
ceive the changes accurately, may want to be strategic, for example cut-
ting employment more than implied by the static labor demand in order
to convince unions that the world has changed. Second, unions may want
to experiment, to move the wage in order to learn faster about the relevant
parameters. We leave both of these issues aside, and focus on what strikes
us as the main e®ect of uncertainty and learning, namely that it takes some
time for unions to learn, and thus to adjust the wage.
So assume that labor demand is still given by equation (1) (so ¯rms are
not strategic), and that unions maximize the expected wage bill period by
period (so they have no incentive to experiment2).
Consider the case where only productivity a is stochastic, and assume that
it follows:
log(at) = log(a¤
t) + ²t; log(a¤
t) = log(a¤
t¡1) + ~ g
2. In fact, for the case we consider below, namely uncertainty about productivity a,
unions have no incentive to experiment since the signal to noise ratio does not depend
on the wage they set. This is no longer the case when unions are uncertain about the
elasticity of capital supply, µ.
9where ²t is i.i.d. normal, and ~ g can take one of two values, ~ g = g or ~ g = 0. In
words, actual productivity is equal to underlying productivity plus white
noise. Underlying productivity growth is either positive or zero.
To capture what happened in the mid 1970s, suppose that underlying pro-
ductivity growth decreases from g to 0. Unions will learn and adjust wages
at a rate which will depend on the tightness of their prior and the standard
deviation of the transitory component. Figure 2 shows such a path, both
for the wage in e±ciency units wt=at and for employment (which is the
mirror image of the wage), based on an initial subjective probability that
~ g = g equal to 0.98, a standard deviation of the transitory shock of 2%,
and a value of g of 1% (the derivation of the path is given in the appendix.)
Figure 2. The response of wages in e±ciency units to a decrease
in productivity growth.
The main feature of Figure 2 is the hump shaped response of the wage
in e±ciency units, which, given the static labor demand function, implies
a hump shaped response of employment and of unemployment. As pro-
ductivity growth slows down, wage growth also decreases but still exceeds
productivity growth for some time. This leads to an increase in the wage
in e±ciency units for some time, until it turns around and returns to its
steady state value. For the parameters we have chosen, this leads to an
increase in wages in e±ciency units of about 5% at the peak, an increase
roughly consistent what is observed in the data at the end of the 1970s for
the European Union as a whole.
Similar dynamics can be derived with respect to the other shocks, be it an
increase in interest rates, or an increase in capital mobility. An increase in
capital mobility, even if it ultimately leads to an increase in employment,
may well also generate a hump shape response of unemployment, with an
initial increase, followed by a larger decrease later on.
10Figure 2: Simulations of Wages and Employment after Slowdown in TFP growth.












Evolution of Employment and Wages after a Slowdown of Productivity Growth
Years
Wages in Efficiency Units
Employment4 Learning, the quality of labor relations, and
unemployment
What might lead to di®erent speeds of learning and adjustment by unions?
Bayesian learning points to di®erences in the tightness of priors, and the
informativeness of signals. More generally, it points to di®erences in ideol-
ogy, and di®erences in the quality of labor relations: The more unions and
¯rms share a common economic model, or the more they discuss the eco-
nomic implications of di®erent shocks, the faster learning and adjustment
is likely to be.
4.1 Quality of labor relations and unemployment
With this motivation in mind, we construct and study the e®ects of two
measures of the quality of labor relations across OECD countries.
² The ¯rst is a measure of strike intensity, from 1960 to 1967. The
motivation for looking at strike activity is a simple one: most of the
theoretical and empirical work on strikes suggests that the quality
of labor relations is an important determinant of strike activity (see,
for example, Hibbs [1987].) The motivation for choosing the period
1960 to 1967 is that this predates the increase in unemployment that
we want to explain. The reason for stopping in 1967 rather than, say,
1970, is that, in the late 1960s, many European countries, especially
France, Germany, and Italy, were a®ected by social and political un-
rest, for reasons largely unrelated to the quality of labor relations.
Two measures of strike activity are available for the 1960s for most
OECD countries. The ¯rst is a measure of days lost in strikes (DL),
the second a measure of workers involved in strikes (WI). We express
both as ratios to employment. When needed, we combine them in one
measure, STRIKE, which we de¯ne by the maximum of normalized









The standard deviations are the cross country standard deviations.
The motivation for using the max speci¯cation is that not all strikes
are recorded, while all recorded strikes actually happened, so both
measures are likely to be lower bounds on strike activity.
As an explanatory variable, this measure presents two problems. The
¯rst is that, in the 1960s, two OECD countries, Spain and Portugal,
were dictatorships, where strike activity was illegal. We have no other
choice, when using this measure, than to drop these two countries
from the sample. The second is that strike activity depends on other
variables than the quality of labor relations, some of them observable
(such as unemployment during the period), some of them unobserv-
able. This implies that using strike activity as a proxy for quality in
a regression entails measurement error. We shall return to the issue
below.
² The second measure is a direct, survey, measure. In 1999, the World
Economic Forum asked the following question to managers of ¯rms
in a large number of countries: \Are labor relations in your ¯rm
cooperative?". The answer was given on a scale from 0 to 7. We use
the country mean response as our second measure of the quality of
labor relations, and denote it by \COOP".
Clearly, this second variable is closer to what we want to capture
than the ¯rst. It su®ers however from an obvious problem of poten-
tial reverse causality, as perceptions of the quality of labor relations
by ¯rms in 1999 may well re°ect in part the evolution of unemploy-
ment since the 1960s. (A similar question was asked in 1993. This is
however also quite late in the period, and the 1993 and 1999 measures
are very highly correlated).
12If we think of the quality of labor relations as a stable feature of an econ-
omy, a natural question is how correlated the two measures of quality are.
The answer is given in Figure 3, which plots COOP against STRIKE, for
the 18 OECD countries for which both measures exist. As can be seen,
there is a strong negative relation between the two (The R2 of the regres-
sion of COOP on STRIKE is equal to 0.62, the t-statistic on the coe±cient
on STRIKE is equal to -5.0). This is good news for our implicit main-
tained hypothesis that the quality of labor relations is a relatively stable
characteristic of countries over time.
Figure 3. Cooperation in 1999 versus Strikes in 1960-1967
We can then turn to the relation between unemployment and the quality
of labor relations over time. To do so, we divide the period 1965-2002
into decades (more speci¯cally 1965-1974, 1975-1984, 1985-1994, and 1995-
2002), and for each decade, we regress:
uit = at + bt(quality measurei) + eit ; (4)
where uit is the mean unemployment rate in decade t in country i. For
each t, the coe±cient at captures the common evolution of unemployment
across countries during the decade. Our interest is in the coe±cient bt,
which captures the extent to which di®erences in the quality measure can
explain di®erences in unemployment across countries during the decade.
Table 1. The quality of labor relations and unemployment rates,
by decade
Basic results are reported in Table 1. The ¯rst regression reports the results
of estimation using the COOP measure. The second regression reports the
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Labor Conflicts in the 1960s
See main text for description of measure of labor conflicts
Fig. 3: Labor Relations and Labor ConflictsTime period 1965-74 1975-84 1985-94 1995-2002
-0.904 -1.769 -2.582 -2.548
0.406 0.648 0.761 0.571
N 2 02 12 12 1
R2 0.216 0.282 0.377 0.512
0.967 1.515 2.219 1.785
0.432 0.712 0.766 0.572
N 1 71 81 81 8
R2 0.251 0.221 0.344 0.379
-0.9 -1.444 -2.484 -2.461
0.633 0.928 1.017 0.695
N 1 71 81 81 8
R2 0.19 0.325 0.412 0.532
Table 1: Labor relations and unemployment in 4 decades. Dependent variable is
average unemployment over the decade. Three regressions are run for each decade,
with a different RHS variable. Figure 4 corresponds to the first regression
(Cooperation, OLS). Standard errors are in italics.
Note: Cooperation in labor relation is, from 1999 survey of managers, the answer to question: "Are
labor relations in your firm cooperative?". Strike activity per employee from 1960 to 1967 is a
composite measure based on employees involved and days lost. Last regression (IV) uses days lost










































relations (IV)their standard deviation, so the coe±cients are directly comparable.) For
reasons discussed earlier, both of these regressions su®er from potential
bias, measurement error for the ¯rst, simultaneity bias for the second. Thus,
in the third line, we report the results of estimation, using days lost per
employee and workers involved as instruments for COOP. If, as plausible,
the measurement error in using the strike measure is uncorrelated with the
disturbance term in the above regression, this yields consistent estimates
of the e®ect of the quality of labor relations on unemployment for each
decade.
All three regressions suggest a strong and signi¯cant e®ect of the quality
of labor relations on unemployment. The magnitudes are largely similar
across the two measures, and across OLS and IV estimation. Countries
with one-standard deviation better quality had about 1% less unemploy-
ment than the average OECD country in 1965-1974, about 1.5 to 2% less
unemployment in 1975-1984, about 2 to 2.5% in 1985-1994, and 1995-2002.
To give a better sense of the results, Figure 4 plots the unemployment rate
against COOP, and the OLS regression line for each of the four decades.
The relation is quite striking, especially in the last two periods.
Figure 4. The quality of labor relations and unemployment rates,
by decade
Standard checks suggests that this relation is robust. Figure 4 makes clear
that the results are not driven by any single country. Using the underlying
components DL and WI separately rather than combined in CONF makes
little di®erence to the results. So does the use of the 1993 answers instead of
the 1999 answers to the World Economic Forum survey. So does controlling
for the average unemployment rate in 1960-1967. Estimating equation (4)
using annual unemployment rather than decadal averages) yields a time
series for estimated ^ bt which is hump shaped, reaching a peak in the mid
1980s, and decreasing at the very end of the sample.
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Cooperation in Labor Relations, 1999 Survey
See Table 1 for corresponding regressions
Fig. 4: Unemployment and Labor Relations4.2 The quality of labor relations, Institutions, and
unemployment
An obvious question at this point is whether the quality of labor rela-
tions a®ects unemployment directly, i.e. given labor market institutions,
or through these institutions themselves. The earlier description of the
Netherlands suggests the presence of at least some direct e®ect: Institu-
tions were reformed only after wage moderation started. We now look at
the cross country evidence.
A natural starting point is to use a speci¯cation which allows for an e®ect
of institutions on unemployment, and then add our measure of quality.
Such a speci¯cation was suggested and explored in earlier work by one of
the two authors [Blanchard and Wolfers 2000]. We use that speci¯cation
as a benchmark and estimate:
uit = (1 + d65¡74 + d75¡84 + d85¡94 + d95¡03)(® +
X
j
¯jXij) + "it (5)
We divide time in 4 decades: 1965-74, 1975-84, 1985-94, 1995-2003 (We
use decades to make the results more comparable to the results presented
earlier. Using half decades as in Blanchard and Wolfers makes little di®er-
ence to the results.) uit is unemployment in country i and decade t, and
Xij is a measure of institution j in country i. This speci¯cation allows for
the impact of the common (unobservable) aggregate shock dt to depend
on a linear combination of the di®erent measures of institutions. The in-
stitutions (described in Blanchard and Wolfers) are the replacement rate,
an index of the length of time for which unemployment bene¯ts are paid,
union coverage, an index of employment protection, an index of active la-
bor market policies, union density, a measure of the tax wedge between
the cost of labor to ¯rms and take-home pay by workers, and a measure of
15coordination of bargaining.
Table 2: Shocks and institutions revisited
Results of estimation of this non-linear speci¯cation are given in Table 2.
The ¯rst column uses only COOP, instrumented by STRIKE. This spec-
i¯cation can be thought as the same as equation (4), with the additional
constraint across time periods that bt=at = constant. This additional con-
straint is close to being satis¯ed by the unconstrained regressions, so the
results are very similar, and our measure of labor quality is, as in Table 1,
very signi¯cant.
The second column uses only the variables in Blanchard and Wolfers, and
the results are, in general, similar to theirs. Institutions are de¯ned so that
their expected sign on unemployment is positive; all coe±cients turn out
to have the expected sign, although only the last 4 are signi¯cant.
The third column uses both institutions and our measure of quality. The
coe±cient on the measure of quality decreases from -0.927 to -0.638, but
remains very signi¯cant. Interestingly, the coe±cients on most institutions
become more signi¯cant than in column 2. One might have expected the
\coordination" variable and our quality variable to capture similar dimen-
sions of labor relations and be very collinear; this is not the case (the
correlation between the two is 0.42), and both dimensions are strongly
signi¯cant.
Column 4 excludes labor market institutions that were not signi¯cant in
column 3. The estimated coe±cient for the quality of labor relations goes
up to -0.834, and is just as signi¯cant as in column 1.
16Table 2: Unemployment over time and across countries. Dependent variable is average unemployment in country i (18 countries) in
decade t (4 decades, 1965-1975-1995-2003). Model is estimated using NLLS (non-linear least squares). Standard errors are in italics.
1234
Variable
Dummy 1975-1984 1.338 1.332 1.342 1.349
0.515 0.438 0.414 0.414
Dummy 1985-1994 2.259 2.209 2.218 2.23
0.691 0.58 0.548 0.549
Dummy 1995-2003 2.057 1.891 1.919 1.931
0.652 0.528 0.502 0.503




Replacement Rate 0.01 0.015 0.018
0.007 0.007 0.007
Benefit Duration 0 -0.011
0.081 0.076
Union Coverage 0.596 0.222
0.326 0.318
Employment Protection 0.031 0.037 0.055
0.03 0.028 0.023
Active Labor Market Policies 0.032 0.026 0.022
0.012 0.011 0.009
Union Density 0.024 0.029 0.03
0.008 0.008 0.007
Tax Wedge 0.039 0.018
0.013 0.013
Coordination of Bargaining 0.766 0.55 0.45
0.169 0.152 0.126
N 7 27 27 27 2
R2 0.645 0.749 0.781 0.773
Institutional variables (from Replacement Rate to Coordination of Bargaining) are from Blanchard and Wolfers, 2002. They are defined such that expected sign is
positive. Spain, Portugal and Greece are excluded from regression due to lack of meaningful strikes data in the 1960's.5 Conclusions and open issues
We see the point of our paper as arguing that, in addition to formal in-
stitutions, the quality of labor relations matters in the determination of
unemployment. Faced with adverse shocks, such as those Europe has faced
in the last three to four decades, countries with better relations appear to
have been better able to limit the rise of unemployment and to turnaround
faster thereafter.
This is both good and bad news for those who want to achieve lower unem-
ployment in Europe. The good news is that, while institutional reform is
clearly important, good labor relations, by themselves, go a long way. The
bad news is that, based on the informal evidence as well as the correlation
between our two measures of quality for the 1960s and the late 1990s, the
quality of labor relations appears slow to change over time, if at all.
This last remark points to the obvious limit of our paper, namely the lack
of a theory for what determines the quality of labor relations, and whether
and how it can be improved over time. This is a large and di±cult topic,
and we shall limit ourselves to a few remarks3.
The quality of labor relations is clearly correlated with a number of union
or country characteristics. The attitude of unions with respect to the pro¯t
rate of ¯rms clearly di®ers between communist, socialist, and social-democratic
unions. Most socialist and social-democratic unions now recognize the need
for ¯rms to maintain an adequate pro¯t rate. The rhetoric of many com-
munist unions, on the other hand, remains largely similar to what it was
30 years ago. The same holds not only for unions, but also for political par-
3. MÄ uller and Philippon [2004] study the link between labor relations and the control
of ¯rms. They ¯nd that, across countries, bad labor relations are associated with more
family control, while good labor relations are associated with more dispersed ownership
of shares. They argue that bad labor relations and tight family control reinforce each
other. This may explain the persistence of bad and good relations that we see in the
data.
17ties.4 Our quality measure is indeed strongly correlated with the number
of communist votes in elections in the 1960s. Whether this should be taken
as correlation, or as a proximate cause for the quality of labor relations, is
still unclear.
Some evidence suggests, however, that the quality of labor relations can
change over time. The example of the UK appears relevant here. Unions
were surely made weaker by the policies of Margaret Thatcher; but there
is wide agreement that they have also changed their attitude (although the
improvement in the quality of labor relations is not visible in our Figure 3,
where the UK is right on the regression line...)
4. Indeed, the best known early statement of the need for \a partnership between capital
and labor" is by Helmut Schmidt, then the Social Democratic Chancellor of Germany,
in 1976: \The pro¯ts of entreprises today are the investments of tomorrow, and the
investments of tomorrow are the jobs of the day after".
18Appendix. Derivation of the wage under learning.
Let pt be the subjective probability held by the union at time t that ~ g = g,
and let p0 be the prior. From the realized employment nt, the union can
extract at but not a¤
t. The information set at the end of period t is therefore
­t = fa0;a1;::;atg.
Under the assumption that the union sets the wage one period in advance,
to maximize the expected wage bill
^ wt+1 = argmax
wt+1
Et [wt+1nt+1]



















Bayesian learning in turn implies
pt = prob(~ g = g j ­t¡1; at)
=













Along the path where " = 0 and ~ g = 0, we have
pt =
pt¡1









pt¡1e¡gt + 1 ¡ pt¡1
and employment is
nt = 1 + µ(1 ¡ ^ wt ¡ r)
The values used to derive the path in Figure 2 are p(0) = 0:98, g = :01,
¾ = :02, r = :1 and µ = 1.
20References
[1] Olivier Blanchard and Justin Wolfers. Shocks and institutions and the
rise of European unemployment. The aggregate evidence. Economic
Journal, 110(1):1{33, March 2000.
[2] Douglas Hibbs. The political economy of industrial democracies. Har-
vard University Press, 1987.
[3] Peter Katzenstein. Small states in world markets. Cornell University
Press, 1985.
[4] Holger MÄ uller and Thomas Philippon. Corporate ownership and labor
relations (around the world). mimeo NYU, 2004.
[5] Stephen Nickell and Jan van Ours. The Netherlands and the United
Kingdom: a European unemployment miracle. Economic Policy, 30,
April 2000.
[6] Ronald Schettkat. Are institutional rigidities at the root of European
unemployment? Cambridge Journal of Economics, 27:771{787, 2003.
[7] Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck. A Dutch miracle. Job growth, welfare
reform and corporatism in the Netherlands. Amsterdam University
Press, Amsterdam, 1997.
21